(Again – this is my viewpoint as an American! The politics and history of this conflict is long, and I will only touch on it briefly.)
For simplification we will refer to the People’s Republic of China as “China”, the Republic of China as “Taiwan” and the physical island itself as Formosa.
Taiwan is an interesting case of how the effects of geography, economics and politics can shape a conflict. The quick recap here is intended to provide a context around the issue. Most Americans today were born well after the parameters of the conflict were set. Before 1971 no America political leader had visited China since the Communist Party established full control.
Current State
Both China and Taiwan agreed to the ambiguous 1992 Consensus which preserved peace between China and Taiwan with the deliberately ambiguous agreement. That agreement was that there is only 1 China and Taiwan is part of it. This fragile agreement has reigned for 30 years but is threatened now. China has grown more frustrated as unification has not occurred and has publicly considered conquering the island by force. The more an independence movement grows in Taiwan, the more bellicose China’s position becomes.
How Did We Get Here
Formosa sits just off the coast of China proper. In the 17th century, the island was nominally a Dutch Colony. But large-scale movement by Han Chinese settled on the island during that time. By 1683, Formosa was annexed and ruled by the Chinese Empire. It remained on the periphery of the Empire as the various dynasties of China fought and established rule.
In the 1800s the Chinese Empire was attacked by foreign governments, mainly European, to provide exclusive economic zones. The most famous of these was the British rule of Hong Kong. In 1894 Japan attacked China and the first Sino-Japanese War began over Korean colonization. Japan quickly beat the embattled Chinese Qing Dynasty forces. As part of peace deal in 1895, The Chinese Empire ceded Formosa to the Japanese Empire. The native Taiwanese rebelled against Japanese occupation in exceptionally brutal fighting, but ultimately succumbed to the more disciplined and well-armed Japanese forces. Formosa then remained part of Japan until the end of World War II.
During most of WWII, a united China put internal conflicts aside to fight Japanese forces. But as WWII ended, the internal fighting flared between the Chinese Communists and Kuomintang (KMT) forces under General Chaing Kai-shek. By 1949 the Communist forces controlled the Chinese mainland, and the KMT had retreated and held only the islands of Formosa and Hainan.
In most circumstances this situation would have lead to the international acceptance that the Communist government in China was the legitimate ruler of China. However, two issues broke what would ordinarily be an easy consensus and prevented the acknowledgement of the Communist victory. First, China under the rule of the KMT was one of the “allies” in WWII. That came with a permeant seat at the United Nations and the ability to stop recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Second, by the time the Communist forces gained control of all China in 1949, the outlines of the cold war were in place and Capitalistic Western powers did not want to recognize a Communist government in China.
By 1971, the UN recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legal rulers of China, ousting the KMT Taiwan government from the UN. In 1979, the United States officially recognized Communist China as the legitimate government instead of the KMT on Taiwan. The US government responded by accepting the rule of Communist China. However, Taiwan was to be provided with technical support, economic aid and implied military support via the Taiwan Relations Act passed that same year. The TRA requires the United States to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan and to be able to resist any attempt to take Taiwan by force.
China has not given up their claim on Taiwan. Starting in the year 2000, China has tried to encourage Taiwan into uniting back with China under the “1 country, 2 systems” blueprint that had been used successfully with Hong Kong.
Despite occasional success and set-backs, an uneasy form of peace has prevailed.
When did this equilibrium change?
In Taiwan there has been a push from many citizens to move towards declaring independence for Taiwan itself and rejecting the “1 country” agreement. China has normally been able to stop this from progressing politically, with tacit American agreement. America has little desire to see Taiwan trigger a war.
Conditions and assumption about an eventual reunification changed in Taiwan with the Chinese crack down on the government of Hong Kong. Suddenly the “2 systems” pledges were seen as a front to extend Chinese dominance and economic systems. Taiwan’s political support in unification was undermined. Now the two countries are once again in disagreement that threatens to grow into a military conflict.
Economic Implications
Both China and Taiwan are critical economies for the United States and the world. China’s economic power and manufacturing capabilities are massive, surpassed or matched only by America. But Taiwan projects considerable economic power itself as a technical exporter. Taiwan is a major provider of both advanced and basic computer chips and semiconductors. Interestingly, much of the Taiwanese product is built and assembled in factories in mainland China, with Taiwan intellectual property and ownership.
The entire world, therefore, is concerned about a military conflict between the two countries. Choosing one country over the other will cut advanced exports due to that choice if there is a war.
Economically, a war between China and Taiwan would cause great disruption worldwide. Pride and history predict that China and Taiwan will ultimately be resolved militarily, but for the world a non-military resolution is desired
What happens if the military option is used to reunify?
The initial impact of Russia’s attack on Ukraine was to provide a blueprint for a Chinese attack on Taiwan; at least that was the lesson the West was afraid of. A successful integration of Ukraine back into Russia might have emboldened those voices in China that push for an attack on Taiwan. But united Western opposition and material support of Ukraine has muddied the calculus of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
It now seems that the Chinese threats manifest as intrusions into Taiwan’s airspace and sea lanes by China. Intrusions that show the limits of Taiwanese forces simply in terms of quantity and the improving Chinese technology.
Furthermore, a Chinese attack would be predicated on the assumption that the United States will not come to Taiwan’s aid. US military support may or may not be coming, but it is difficult, particularly since US support of Ukraine, to count out action by the United States. Even if the United States does not come to Taiwan’s aid, the reaction of other Pacific countries may disrupt the status quo. Japan, South Korea and possibly Vietnam would be worried enough about Chinese aggression to acquire nuclear weapons. South Korea and Japan already have the technology and raw materials to create nuclear capability almost immediately.
So What’s Next
(I my opinion) For the short term - say 1 to 3 years, posturing and threats from China will continue, albeit with no military action against Taiwan. This might change radically if Chinese Premier Xi feels threatened as a leader. Promoting nationalism against South Korea, Japan and Taiwan solidifies a leader’s status in China and is often used to redirect the people’s anger. This is particular effective in China because the media and internet is strictly controlled by the Party.
Longer term, I see China turning more inward as the population ages. The Taiwan issue may become less important as China works to deal with an aging population. Outside forces also play a role in the relationship. For example, when the North Korea situation gets more volatile then the Taiwan issue is ignored.
It also depends on America’s focus. During the America First policies of the last Republican administration, focus was shifted towards confronting China economically, but there was no a corresponding political support for Taiwan. The Biden administration by contrast has been quite vocal about supporting the Taiwanese government in any struggle with China.
New administrations in one or both countries have the ability to repair relations or propel them into greater conflict. But I think the most desired solution by third parties is to repair and reaffirm the 1992 Consensus. However, I don’t think anyone outside of China has a great handle on their thinking of the situation.